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CHAPTER II
DENIALISM AND THE PROBLEM 
OF INDIFFERENCE
Willem De Haan*
In Albert Camus’ classic novel La Peste, a physician diagnoses the plague. Soon, 
however, he discovers that the people around him refuse to acknowledge the 
threat of the contagious disease. When, at last, they can no longer deny the fact 
that an epidemic has infected them, it is too late.1
In recent years, La Peste has been read as a comment on denialism of the 
AIDS epidemic.2 Traditionally, however, Camus’ novel was interpreted as an 
allegory of how the French population responded to the occupation of France 
by Nazi Germany. At fi rst, they could not imagine that the German army would 
force the French army to surrender. Th en they wanted to believe that it would be 
best to submit and live with the inevitability of a long-term occupation or to even 
collaborate with the occupational forces.
Obviously, the meaning readers gave this allegory – in 1947, when the novel 
was fi rst published – is quite diff erent from the meaning the story has for readers 
today. As historian Carl Becker has noted:
‘it is well known that every generation writes the same history in a new way, and puts 
upon it a new construction. Th e reason why this is so … is that our imagined picture 
[of a past event] is always determined  … by our own present purposes, desires, 
prepossessions, and prejudices, all of which enter into the process of knowing it.’3
* Professor of Criminology Emeritus and Senior Research Fellow, Department of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, VU University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
1 Th e example is taken from C.  Hamelton, ‘What can history teach us about climate 
change denial?’ in: S. Weintrobe (ed.), Engaging with Climate Change: Psychoanalytic and 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Routledge, Sussex 2013, pp. 16-32, at pp. 26-27.
2 Th e denial, against conclusive scientifi c evidence, that the human immunodefi ciency virus 
(HIV) is the cause of Acquired Immune Defi ciency Syndrome (AIDS).
3 C.L. Becker, ‘What are Historical Facts?’ in: H. Meyerholtt (ed.), Th e Philosophy of History 








In other words, even though the past itself does not change, it will be rewritten 
by every new generation.4
An example of rewriting the past is the debate concerning what the general 
population in the Netherlands ‘knew’ about the Holocaust.5 It is a question 
that even today, 70 years aft er the war, continues to create confl ict and 
controversy.
In the 1960s, it was argued that, during the war, the general population did 
not know about the Holocaust because available information was fragmented, 
inconsistent and, untrustworthy. In the 1980s, that view was challenged by the 
argument that people could have known but did not want to know what was 
going on. Information about large-scale ‘extermination’ of Jews was available, 
but many preferred to deny the facts and remain ignorant.
In his prize-winning but controversial book Wij weten niets van hun lot 
(We know nothing of their fate), historian Bart van der Boom has recently 
challenged the view that the general population looked the other way when 
their Jewish neighbours were deported, and were, therefore, complicit in their 
fate.6 On the basis of his analysis of more than 100 diaries, Van den Boom 
concludes, that most people could not know what was going on because they 
just could not believe that the deported Jews would be killed in gas chambers 
upon their arrival in the concentration camps. Th eir disbelief was not a matter 
of denial, but of incomprehension.7 What happened, simply, was beyond their 
imagination.
4 In fact, each new generation not only has a need, but also a right, to re-interpret history in its 
own way.
5 Note that the term ‘Holocaust’ was not in common usage until well into the 1970. In the 1950s, 
historians started to apply the term ‘holocaust’ (‘inferno’) as an equivalent to the Hebrew 
term ‘shoah’ (‘catastrophe’) when referring to the mass murder of the Jews by the Nazis 
(1939-1945). However, it was not until well into the 1970s that the term started to become 
more commonly used. D.  Diner, Beyond the Conceivable: Studies on Germany, Nazism, 
and the Holocaust, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles 2000. Quoted 
by J.C. Alexander, ‘On the Social Construction of Moral Universals: Th e `Holocaust’ from 
War’ (2002) 5 European Journal of Social Th eory 1, 5-85, at 27.
6 B. Van Der Boom, Wij weten niets van hun lot, Boom, Amsterdam 2012.
7 Following infl uential historians such as A.  Herzberg, J.  Presser and L.  De Jong, 
F. Bovenkerk has also argued that the existence of extermination camps went beyond the 
imagination of most of the Dutch population, and that only later, aft er the war had ended, 
it became fully clear what had happened in Auschwitz and the other extermination camps. 
F. Bovenkerk, ‘Het Nederlandse aandeel in de jodenvervolging als criminologisch probleem’ 
in: M.  Moerings, C.M.  Pelser and C.H.  Brants (eds.), Morele kwesties in het strafrecht, 
Gouda Quint, Deventer 1999, p. 11-31, at p. 15. E. Moraal, Als ik morgen niet op transport 
ga. Kamp Westerbork in beleving en herinnering, De Bezige Bij, Amsterdam 2014 has shown 
that the same applies to Dutch Jews. American Jews could also not believe what they heard 
about extermination because it was, for them, ‘unimaginable’. I.L. Horowitz, Taking Lives: 
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Th e debate about what the general population ‘really knew’ about the 
Holocaust raises many questions8, including the three which the organisers of 
this conference on Denialism and Human Rights have asked me to address:
1. What exactly is denial?
2. What are the implications of denial concerning human rights violations?
3. And how do we have to deal with them?9
1. WHAT IS DENIAL?
As you probably all know, the late Stanley Cohen has been the pioneer in 
addressing these questions.10
In his groundbreaking11 – and now classic – book States of Denial. Knowing 
About Atrocities And Suff ering12, he notes that ‘denial’ is a notoriously elusive 
concept which can mean many things. But the only ‘legitimate use’ of the term 
‘denial’ is ‘when persons, who, as audiences, bystanders, observers, onlookers, 
spectators or witnesses, have come to see, hear or know what happened or is 
going on – either at the time or later, for whatever reason – in good or bad faith – 
claim not to know.’13
8 For example, questions concerning silence and silencing or concerning the diff erence 
between disbelief and denial.
9 Th e conference is based on the assumption that deeply embedded denialism causes and/or 
facilitates human rights violations, because the true nature of the problems remains fully or 
partly unacknowledged and as a result appropriate actions remains absent. More ambitious 
would, therefore, be trying to answer the question: what social, economic, cultural and 
political structures provide for denialist defence mechanisms in society? And how do we 
acknowledge and address this problem of denialism and develop strategies to move beyond it? 
Answering these questions lies, however, beyond the scope of this essay.
10 Re-reading his book for this occasion, has been emotional.  It made me aware of how much 
Stan, who sadly passed away last year (7  January 2013), is missed. I have always deeply 
admired his work, to begin with his chapter on ‘Guilt, Justice and Tolerance: Some Old 
concepts for a New Criminology’ published in 1979 in D.  Downes and P.  Rock (eds.), 
Deviant Interpretations, Martin Robertson, Oxford 1979, pp. 17-51. Th is chapter has been a 
great inspiration for writing my book Th e Politics of Redress: Crime, Punishment, and Penal 
Abolition, Unwin Hyman, London 1990, for which Stan Cohen, kindly, wrote a wonderful 
Preface.
11 Not many scholars have tried to develop a more general conceptualisation of denial than 
Stan Cohen. See R. Moerland, Th e Killing of Death. Denying the genocide against the Tutsi, 
Diss. Maastricht University, Maastricht 2015, p.  87, note 92. Moerland does not, however, 
mention Eviatar Zerubavel’s eff ort. See: E. Zerubavel, ‘Th e Social Sound of Silence: Toward 
A Sociology of Denial’ in: E. Ben-Ze’ev, R. Ginio and J. Winter (eds.), Shadows of War: A 
Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2010, pp. 32-46.









Denial can be a personal and private state of mind, but also a public, social and 
cultural phenomenon. At the personal level, the process of denial ‘includes cognition 
(not acknowledging the facts); emotion (not being disturbed); [and] morality (not 
recognizing wrongness or responsibility). A person who is in denial will refrain 
from action (will not take any steps in response to the unwanted knowledge).’14
But, denial is always a collective eff ort. People learn from one another what 
they are socially expected to ignore – that is, not look at, not listen to, not speak 
about. Collective denial is based on a ‘shared reconstruction of reality’15 in 
which painful realities are not – or only partially – acknowledged.16
Collective denial may emerge as a spontaneous social and cultural 
phenomenon ‘when an entire segment of society  … turns away from reality 
in favor of a more comfortable lie. But collective denial can also be offi  cially 
initiated and organized by the state, for example, as in the concerted covering up 
a record of genocide or other past atrocities’(p. 12).
A well-known example of state-organised denial is the Armenian genocide 
that took place between 1915 and 1917. Th e facts are thoroughly documented in 
offi  cial records, survivors’ accounts, witness testimonies and historical research. 
Yet successive Turkish governments have consistently denied that a genocide 
took place.
Th is obliteration of the past is an example of what Cohen has called literal 
denial: asserting that a statement about past reality is, in fact, untrue. It is 
perhaps the most obvious form of denial which, in this case, is offi  cially 
organised and ‘built into the ideological façade of the state’ (p. 10).
State-organised denial, however, concerns not only literal denial.  In 
discourses of offi  cial denial, we may also fi nd interpretive denial.  Th is form of 
denial ‘concedes that something is happening but that this “something” must be 
seen in a diff erent light.’17
An example of interpretive denial would be that during the Second World 
War concepts like ‘annihilation’, ‘elimination’, ‘eradication’ and ‘extinction’ – 
which currently mean ‘murder upon arrival in the extermination camps’ – were 
believed to refer to death caused by hard labour, hunger and exhaustion.18
14 Ibid., p. 11.
15 M.A. Milburn and S.D. Conrad, Th e Politics of Denial, MIT Press, London 1996, p. 3.
16 Like, for example, the fact that, from 1945 to 1949, the Dutch military committed ‘war crimes’ 
on a considerable scale is still not openly acknowledged. S.  Scagliola, ‘Th e Silences and 
Myths of a “Dirty War”: Coming to terms with the Dutch-Indonesian Decolonization War 
(1945-1949)’ (2007) 14(2) European Review of History 235-262, 243. Quoted in R. Moerland, 
Th e Killing of Death. Denying the genocide against the Tutsi, Diss. Maastricht University, 
Maastricht 2015, p. 97, note 106.
17 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, London 
2001, p. 22.
18 Th e example is given by B. Van Der Boom, Wij weten niets van hun lot, Boom, Amsterdam 







Chapter II. Denialism and the Problem of Indiff erence
Intersentia 13
A third form of denial, is what Cohen has called implicatory denial.  Th is 
form of denial is not about facts, nor about their interpretation, but rather about 
the moral signifi cance of what has happened or is happening.
A historical example of implicatory denial is that during the Second World 
War the majority of population in the Netherlands could see with their own eyes 
how Jews were removed from their jobs, evicted from their homes and deported 
from their country. However, even though people knew this was happening, they 
denied the moral signifi cance of these events and their own moral responsibility 
to intervene by helping their Jewish neighbours or colleagues to survive.19
What these forms of denial have – or, at least, should have – in common is 
that they refer to a state of mind that is, at least in part, unconscious.20
Th e reality of what is happening is both acknowledged and, to some extent, 
hidden from consciousness. While people are vaguely aware of choosing not 
to look at the facts, they are not quite conscious of what exactly it is that they 
are trying to evade. It is this intriguing ‘paradox of knowing and not knowing’ 
which – according to Cohen21 – is at the heart of the concept of denial.
2. WHAT IS DENIALISM?
Unlike ‘denial’, ‘denialism’ is not a common term.22 In Cohen’s book States of 
Denial the word ‘denialism’ is not even used once.23 And, in fact, I have not been 
able to fi nd a single scientifi c publication in which the term was actually properly 
defi ned.24
19 Th is (implicatory) denial of responsibility has been proposed as a possible explanation for the 
disturbing fact that – of all Western European countries that were occupied by Nazi Germany 
– the Netherlands had the highest proportion of its Jewish population that did not survive 
the war. For a scientifi c explanation of this phenomenon, see P. Griffioen and R. Zeller, 
Jodenvervolging in Nederland, Frankrijk en België 1940-1945, Boom, Amsterdam 2010 (2nd 
ed.) (1st ed. 2008).
20 Denial in the ‘vernacular sense’ of declaring something not to be true is not necessarily denial in 
the ‘scientifi c sense’ of an unconscious process. See E.E. Trunnel and W.F. Holt, ‘Th e Concept 
of Denial or Disavowal’ (1974) 22 Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 775.
21 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, 
London 2001, p. 22.
22 K. Kahn-Harris, ‘Unreasonable doubt’, New Humanist 25.05.2010, pp. 14-17.
23 When Stanley Cohen, in 2011, did use the term in a discussion about climate change, he used 
it in an ambivalent (or even contradictory) way. On the one hand, he considered denialism 
as ‘yet another variant of generic denial’. But on the other, it was for him ‘the polar opposite’ 
of denial’. S. Cohen, ‘Climate change in a perverse culture’ in: S. Weintrobe, Engaging with 
Climate Change: Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Routledge, Sussex 2013, 
pp. 72-79.
24 In this respect Roland Moerland’s doctoral thesis is no exception. In this thesis, which ‘deals 
with the phenomenon of genocide denialism’ at p. 15, the term denialism itself is not defi ned. 
In a footnote a reference is made to C. Tatz, With intent to destroy: Refl ections on genocide, 








Th e ‘ism’ of ‘denialism’ would suggest a philosophical, political or moral 
system of mutually supportive beliefs. In actual fact, however, denialism is more 
a form of newspeak. It is used as a polemical term in various contexts25, but most 
prominently in debates about medical and environmental problems like AIDS26 
and climate change.
In these debates, ‘denialism’ entails rhetorical arguments to discredit and 
undermine well-established but unwelcome positions in scientifi c debates.27 
At fi rst glance, it seems as if scientifi c truth is itself at stake in these debates. 
At second glance, however, it becomes clear that the aim of denialism is not to 
engage in legitimate scientifi c debate, but merely to create the appearance of a 
scientifi c debate.28
As a social and cultural phenomenon, denialism has not been the subject 
of any sustained analysis, with one notable exception: the American journalist 
Michael Spector. In his book Denialism: how irrational thinking hinders scientifi c 
progress, harms the planet, and threatens our lives29 he explores the ways in 
which rigorous and open-minded scientifi c skepticism is being replaced with the 
infl exible certainty of ideological commitment and conviction.
Th e kinds of denialism that Spector is concerned with are less extreme 
than Holocaust denialism. It is not so much the fanaticism of a small minority 
of active deniers that concerns him, but rather the vulnerability of the general 
population to plausible and pervasive forms of denialism concerning, for 
example, food security, public health and evidence-based medicine.
In these contexts, he understands denialism as a natural response to deep-
seated fears of losing control and an attempt to cope with social change in a 
globalising world. As a coping mechanism, denialism seems similar to denial to 
the extent that both are based on unintentional and – in many circumstances – 
understandable, if not entirely forgivable, human shortcomings.
We all have moments where we know what is happening, but cannot resist 
the wishful thought that this cannot possibly be true. In States of Denial, 
Cohen quotes the writer Saul Bellow as saying that the state of knowing and 
not knowing is one of the most frequent of human arrangements. Cohen agrees 
with Bellow, but adds that the mental state of denial serves not only those who 
merely uses it ‘to denote a range of denialist and denial-like behaviors’ (R.  Moerland, 
Th e Killing of Death. Denying the genocide against the Tutsi, Diss. Maastricht University, 
Maastricht 2015, note 1).
25 Other than AIDS and climate change, denialism has been related to such diff erent issues as 
abortion, circumcision, evolution, Lyme Disease, and vaccinations.
26 Early – if not the fi rst – use of the word ‘denialism’ was made in the struggle to prevent AIDS 
by E. Cameron, ‘Th e dead hand of denialism’, 2003 Mail & Guardian Johannesburg.
27 P.A.  Diethelm and M.  Mckee, ‘Denialism: what is it and how should scientists respond?’ 
(2009) 19(1) European Journal of Public Health 2-4, 2.
28 S. Cohen, ‘Climate change in a perverse culture’ in: S. Weintrobe, Engaging with Climate 
Change: Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Routledge, Sussex 2013, p. 76.
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fear their own suff ering (or loss of control). Denial also serves perpetrators 
who infl ict suff ering on other human beings. And it serves all those who 
witness or know about the suff ering of others but do nothing to intervene.30 
Th ese practices are more pertinent when denialism becomes what Spector calls 
‘denial writ large’.
It is in these cases, I would argue, that the term ‘denialism’ is not very helpful. 
It is even misleading to suggest that there is an equivalence between debates 
about the Holocaust and, for example, climate change. It is misleading because, 
as Cohen has put it, the Holocaust refers to a well-documented set of events that 
happened in recorded history, while climate change is a scientifi c prediction of 
what is likely to happen in the future.31
In the case of climate change, there is and ought to be room for respectable 
scientifi c skepticism, whereas with regard to the Holocaust there is not and 
ought not to be room for ‘reasonable doubt’. It is in this vein, that – at least in 
some jurisdictions – Holocaust denial is a criminal off ence whereas denial of 
climate change is, at least legally, legitimate under the principle of freedom of 
expression.32
In sum, denialism is an unclear notion. It has not been clearly delineated 
in scientifi c discourse and, therefore, easily lends itself to misunderstandings 
in public debate. I believe that in relation to gross human rights violations, 
we should have serious doubts about the analytical usefulness and political 
implications of denialism as a concept.
By applying denialism the way the term is currently used, we run the risk that 
gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity become an object of 
pseudo-scientifi c debate about facts and their interpretation, while – if only as an 
unintended consequence – the moral dimensions of denial are overlooked, i.e. 
the moral responsibility of acknowledging the facts and the moral obligation to 
intervene in order to protect.
If you, nevertheless, persist in using the term denialism with regard to 
gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity, then use it, at 
least, in ways that are consistent with how the concept of ‘denial’ is defi ned in 
scientifi c discourse.33
30 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, 
London 2001, p. 50.
31 S. Cohen, ‘Climate change in a perverse culture’ in: S. Weintrobe, Engaging with Climate 
Change: Psychoanalytic and Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Routledge, Sussex 2013, p. 77.
32 Incidentally, it has been proposed that denying HIV as a cause of AIDS ought to be 
criminalised given the harm caused by denial of AIDS.
33 As ‘a mechanism of defense that serves to provide an actor with protection against a reality 
which is for some reason perceived as too threatening to acknowledge and – when engaged 
in – results in the paradoxical self-deceptive state of knowing and not knowing at the same 
time.’ R.  Moerland, Th e Killing of Death. Denying the genocide against the Tutsi, Diss. 









In the remainder of this article, I will limit myself to implicatory rather than 
literal or interpretive denial. And, rather than on past events, I will be focusing 
on denial of actual and ongoing human suff ering and even of ‘atrocities and 
suff ering that lie ahead.’34
More specifi cally, I will be looking at what has been called ‘perhaps the most 
overwhelming (and the most overwhelmingly obvious) reaction and response 
to gross human rights violations and crimes against humanity: indiff erence.’35 
Indiff erence may be defi ned as a form of ‘moral disengagement whereby people 
disavow their responsibility for the problem or the solution.’36
With regard to atrocities and gross human rights violations, indiff erence 
is ‘a lack of concern on the part of those who are not the suff erers towards the 
abuses and aff ronts, the insults and miseries that are experienced by others.’37 In 
other words, we are indiff erent if we know that cruelty is being perpetrated upon 
others and do not care or feel compelled to do anything about it.
Being indiff erent is a state of mind that we are all familiar with, even 
though we, probably, would rather not admit it. Personally, I oft en feel totally 
overwhelmed by the images of human suff ering that we are being confronted 
with day by day. Even though I have a professional interest in these events, there 
is always more information than one can – cognitively and emotionally – deal 
with, let alone do something about.
Given that there are always many other things that need to be done, I oft en 
feel tempted to ignore – at least part of – the information that – day in, day out 
– is made available about atrocities and gross human rights violations taking 
place elsewhere in the world. It is tempting to avoid such disturbing information 
that invariably feels like an unwelcome interruption of daily life. However, being 
(half-consciously) aware of the fact that I know but do not (want to) know about 
what is going on elsewhere in the world also leaves me feeling guilty and, when I 
look at myself through the eyes of others, even ashamed.38
34 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, 
London 2001, p. 288.
35 K. Tester, Moral Culture, Sage, London 1997, p. 16.
36 C.  Hamilton, ‘Why We Resist the Truth About Climate Change. A Paper to the Climate 
Controversies: Science and Politics conference Museum of Natural Sciences’, Brussels 
28.10.2010, p. 5.
37 K. Tester, ‘A theory of indiff erence’ (2002) 1, 2 Journal of Human Rights 173-186, 175.
38 Aft er the Second World War, German philosopher K.  Jaspers (Th e Question of German 
Guilt, Dial Press, New York 1947) famously distinguished – amongst others – moral and 
metaphysical guilt. Moral guilt concerned people who, during the Holocaust, went on with 
their activities as if nothing happened. In the moral sense, we should also be guilty when 
today in the face of human suff ering elsewhere in the world, we carry on with our business 
as usual where we could, and, indeed, should, do something to stop or prevent it. In the 
metaphysical sense, however, we are guilty of the suff ering of other human beings regardless 
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Uncomfortable feelings of guilt and shame confront us with questions like: 
how do we decide where and when to look or not to look, to read or not to read, 
to listen or not to listen and, fi nally and most importantly, to act or not to act? In 
other words, how do we maintain a morally viable position vis-á-vis an overload 
of information on human suff ering in the world in which we live? Rather than 
focusing on my own moral inadequacy, I will now turn to a more sociological 
analysis and critique of indiff erence.
As social and cultural phenomenon, indiff erence to the suff ering of 
others is ‘an inevitable and inescapable dimension of social relationships and 
arrangements.’39 It is a condition, however, that is exacerbated in what sociologist 
Zygmunt Bauman40 has called ‘liquid modernity’, i.e. a world in which social 
forms and institutions no longer have enough time to solidify and cannot serve 
as frames of reference for human actions.
Liquid modernity, according to Bauman, ‘weakens the pressure of moral 
responsibility [and] promotes indiff erence to the plight of the Other which 
otherwise would be subject to moral evaluation and morally motivated 
response.’41 In this context, we all become bystanders of human suff ering, while, 
at the same time, the distinction between bystander and accomplice or accessory 
becomes increasingly tenuous.42
As a result, the phenomenon of indiff erence becomes ‘a serious moral 
problem’.43 Not responding to the suff ering of others – ‘if only by off ering them, 
at least, a spark of hope’ – is, in the words of Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, to 
deny their humanity and betray our own.44
Most of us are aware of distant human suff ering only indirectly, through 
information provided by the mass media and by professional humanitarian 
organisations like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Doctors 
without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières). As a result of their eff orts, our discourse 
about human suff ering ‘is largely the product of their moral imagination.’45
Sociologists like Stanley Cohen and Zygmunt Bauman are rather 
pessimistic about the ways in which mass media and human rights 
organisations are tackling the problem of indiff erence to human suff ering by 
providing actual information.
prevent it. Th e other forms of guilt are criminal guilt concerning the responsibility for acts 
which are ‘capable of objective proof and violate unequivocal laws’ (p. 31) and political guilt 
concerning the responsibility for ‘the consequences of the state whose power governs me and 
under whose order I live’ (p. 31).
39 K. Tester, ‘A theory of indiff erence’ (2002) 1(2) Journal of Human Rights 173-186, 175.
40 Z. Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Polity, Cambridge 2000.
41 Z. Bauman, ‘From bystander to actor’ (2003) 1(2) Journal of Human Rights 137-151, 199.
42 Ibid., p. 139.
43 K. Tester, ‘A theory of indiff erence’ (2002) 1(2) Journal of Human Rights 173-186, 175.
44 E. Wiesel, 1999.









4. THE MASS MEDIA
While academic research can draw some public attention to atrocities and gross 
human rights violations, journalists can reach much wider audiences and their 
reports on atrocities taking place elsewhere in the world, can reach us almost in 
real time.
Yet, despite the fact that, today, we are better informed about human suff ering 
of distant others than any generation before us, indiff erence prevails. Th e mere 
scale of the atrocities as well as their geographical distance give us a sense that 
they belong to another world: a ‘hyper-reality’ which we experience as external 
and remote. And the constant repetition of images of atrocities by the media only 
increases our sense of the remoteness of these events from our daily lives.46
Instead of becoming consciously engaged with what we see and hear, we tend to 
sit back and let the images and reports ‘wash over us’. And while we sit and watch, 
we become anaesthetised to any moral impact those images should have upon us.
Th e main problem with images of human suff ering, however, ‘is not 
their multiplicity but their  … moral distance.’47 In his book Moral Culture, 
philosopher Keith Tester claims that we experience distant wars and atrocities in 
the media as ‘completely and utterly banal’.48
While, undoubtedly, there is some truth to this claim, it is too general for at 
least two reasons.
Th e fi rst reason is that members of Muslim communities in Western Europe 
are far from indiff erent to the suff ering of distant others in counties like Iraq, 
Afghanistan or Syria. On the contrary.
Th eir identifi cation with who they see as their ‘brothers and sisters’ explains 
why they identify with victims of bloodshed in ways that most non-Muslims 
cannot or do not show. For most non-Muslims, distant victims of human 
suff ering tend to be ‘othered’ as belonging to diff erent cultures and religions and, 
therefore, excluded from the sphere of universal solidarity and human rights.
Tester’s claim is also too general, given that massive mobilisation for 
humanitarian emergencies through the media is occasionally successful. In these 
cases, television viewers do seem to be touched by the sight of human suff ering 
and do want ‘to do something’ about it. Some people, spontaneously, take the 
initiative to organise help, e.g. by collecting clothing or food and transporting it 
to emergency situations. Th is shows that it is possible to invoke a moral response 
to distant human suff ering, even though these periodic outbursts of solidarity 
are seldom and – according to Bauman – a ‘sorely inadequate, alternative to the 
meek acceptance of the state of aff airs.’49
46 Ibid., p. 194.
47 Ibid., p. 194.
48 K. Tester, Moral Culture, Sage, London 1997, p. 28.






Chapter II. Denialism and the Problem of Indiff erence
Intersentia 19
In general, however, public engagement is limited to those victims we can 
somehow identify with. But even then this engagement goes no further than 
demanding that ‘something must be done’ whereby it remains totally unclear 
what this ‘something’ is that needs to be done. Actually, this should be no 
surprise as, in fact, ‘it is far from evident what (if anything) can be done by us to 
make a real diff erence.’50
One of the most popular responses to suff ering is ‘getting someone else to 
do it for us’ by sending money (or counting on the government to do so). Th e 
attraction of this ‘monetisation of morality’ is, that it allows us to claim – 
unashamedly – that we did what we had to do, that we could not have done more 
than we did and that, therefore, we should be absolved from our moral guilt.
5. HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATIONS
One reason why professional organisations like Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch, and Doctors without Borders fail in their task to move and 
mobilise people and to create public pressure in order to stop human rights 
violations, is that they fail to tackle the problem of indiff erence adequately.
In States of Denial, Cohen analyses how these organisations try to move and 
mobilise us by making moral appeals and inducing feelings of guilt. Guilt is 
induced by making us ‘feel bad’ for living our comfortable life as if we do not 
know – what we obviously do know – about horrors taking place elsewhere in 
the world. Th is strategy does not work because – as Cohen has pointed out – 
the ‘guilt-induction chain’ is weak. Instead of moving people to take action, 
these moral appeals even seem to have the opposite eff ect. Th is is because ‘the 
more responsible and “bad” you feel for not doing anything … the less you feel 
motivated to absorb more information [and] the more likely you are to shut out 
and switch off .’51
A second reason why these organisations fail to move and mobilise people 
is that the resources for a moral response to the instances of distant human 
suff ering have been exhausted and ‘evacuated of any power’.52 Th e routine 
translation of what Bauman has called ‘morally pregnant knowledge’ into 
abstract legal and political discourse fails to mobilise people and passes the 
ownership of a human rights problems into the hands of a – what Cohen has 
called – ‘bureaucratic cartel’ of human rights professionals. It may, therefore, be 
concluded – with a quote from Lawrence Langer – that: ‘Until we fi nd a way of 
toppling the barrier that sequesters mass suff ering in other regions of the world 
50 Ibid., p. 146.
51 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, 
London 2001, p. 216.








from the comfort and the safety we enjoy far from its ravages, little will be done 
to rouse the attention of our political and professional leaders, to say nothing of 
our own.’53
6. TACKLING THE PROBLEM OF INDIFFERENCE
If providing actual information about atrocities is not eff ective in rousing the 
attention of people and ending their indiff erence to human suff ering, then what is?
A possible remedy, is to try make people feel ashamed about being 
uninformed about the suff ering of distant others. In States of Denial, Cohen has 
noted that the moral appeal to shame is used much less than the appeals made to 
guilt which, as we have seen, do not work or even are counterproductive. Instead 
of inducing guilt feelings, it would, therefore, make more sense to try to induce 
feelings shame.54 Shame is a highly uncomfortable feeling to be sure. However, it 
can make us aware of our indiff erence and motivate us to do something about it.55
It is an uncomfortable feeling that should be welcomed also because it, 
paradoxically, shows that we are not totally indiff erent and, in principle at least, 
are willing to consider and maybe even do something about the human suff ering 
of distant others. Shame is, therefore, essential in ways that guilt is not.
As a socially productive emotion, shame also appeals to a sense of community 
and moral interdependence rather than to personal responsibility alone.
Th e public shaming of indiff erence does not allow us to ‘feel good’ about 
ourselves, individually and collectively. Our feelings of shame challenge us and 
force us to re-evaluate our ideas and assumptions about ourselves and the world 
we live in.
Although, as citizens, we tend to defer our judgments on atrocities and gross 
human rights violations by arguing ‘that nothing we can do will make much 
diff erence anyway’.56 Morally, this is, of course, hardly a sustainable position.
As the American philosopher Michael Walzer has noted in his book Just and 
Unjust Wars, when we – as ordinary citizens – ’go along with’ the policies and 
human rights violations that our governments commit, support or condone, 
53 L.L.  Langer, ‘Th e Alarmed Vision: Social Suff ering and Holocaust Atrocity’ (1996) 125(1) 
Daedalus 47-65, 47.
54 S.  Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Suff ering, Polity Press, 
London 2001, p. 11.
55 Th is is why indiff erence can be considered as a form of denial. Avoiding information without 
acknowledging that we are actually doing so would be an example of ‘meta-denial’. Our moral 
(or metaphysical) is then neutralised by denying the denial. E. Zerubavel, ‘Th e Social Sound 
of Silence: Toward A Sociology of Denial’ in: E. Ben-Ze’ev, R. Ginio and J. Winter (eds.), 
Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 32-46, at p. 69.
56 M.  Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, Basic 
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we are ‘collectively liable’ for the crimes against humanity that are committed, 
supported or condoned ‘in our name’.57
Of course, as ordinary citizens we do not – in any way – cause these crimes 
and – as such – we are not legally liable for them. But ‘[w]hile passivity … is too 
diff use to give rise to any meaningful form of legal responsibility, it nonetheless 
has consequences which raise important issues about [moral] responsibility.’58 
As citizens, we have a collective moral responsibility to ensure that our 
governments are not a source of unjust harm to others.59 By remaining passive 
(or failing to protest), we risk – albeit in only a small way – supporting such 
wrongdoings and adding to the appearance of their legitimacy.
Th is also applies when our government supports or condones human 
rights violations committed by others or fails to comply with the international 
‘responsibility to protect.’
In these cases, the responsibility to protect, which is usually used as an 
argument for justifi ed military interventions, may just as well be used as an 
argument to justify ‘a responsibility to protest’60 against unjustifi ed military 
interventions in order to prevent the human rights violations that are committed 
during these interventions and cause human suff ering elsewhere in the world.
And this is exactly what millions of people in more than 600 cities in 60 
countries around the world did on February 16, 2004. Th ey were ashamed of and 
protested against crimes that were being committed – as they put it – ‘Not in 
Our Name’. Th is was a global political protest against the military intervention 
in Iraq, against the way in which that intervention had been decided, and 
against the lack of accountability the governments of the US and the UK had 
demonstrated toward the citizens in whose name these decisions were taken.61
It is in this same vein that Crawford62 argues that, as ordinary citizens we 
always have a collective moral responsibility to deliberate, monitor, and make 
judgments about such issues. And, I may add, we have a collective moral 
responsibility to counter the denialism of our governments if they try to deny 
atrocities and gross human rights violations that are currently occurring or that 
have occurred in the past.
57 In K.  Jaspers, Th e Question of German Guilt, Fordham University Press, New York 2002, 
p. 55, German philosopher Karl Jaspers has argued that the German people were collectively 
liable for the acts committed by their state. He wrote that: ‘we are politically responsible for 
our regime, for the acts of the regime, for the start of the war in this world historical situation.’
58 L. Farmer (2007) 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy 151-156, 154.
59 J. Mcmahan, Killing in War, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009, p. 215.
60 N.C.  Crawford, ‘War “In Our Name” and Responsibility to Protest: Ordinary Citizens, 
Civil Society, and Prospective Moral Responsibility’ (2014) 38 Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
138-170, 148.
61 J.  Williams, ‘“Not in My Name”? Legitimate Authority and Liberal Just War Th eory’ in: 
A.F.  Lang Jr., C. O’driscoll and J.  Williams (eds.), Just War, Authority, Traditions and 
Practice, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC 2013, p. 75.
62 N.C. Crawford, ‘War “In Our Name” and Responsibility to Protest: Ordinary Citizens, Civil 








7. DENIALISM AND CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY
Finally, I would like to address the question of what role criminology could 
play in countering indiff erence and mobilising support for human rights 
interventions.
Within the fi eld of criminology, it has been argued that an ‘engagement’ with 
human rights is a ‘scholarly and moral responsibility’63 and, as such, ‘essential 
for 21th century criminology’.64 It is the only way to ensure that the ‘next 
generation’ of criminologists ‘need never again be bystanders to genocide’.65
Th e call for criminologists to become engaged in this kind of work 
is, however, based on the presumption that criminology can provide the 
knowledge of how to create public awareness of atrocities and gross human 
rights violations and of how to make sure that these crimes against humanity 
will not happen again.66
In his book Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer raises the issue of how 
to get one’s fellow citizens to think seriously about these issues, even though he 
notes that it is ‘not easy to know’ what sort of actions would need to be taken in 
order to achieve this.
Although academic research cannot draw as much public attention to 
atrocities and human rights violations as journalists who reach much wider 
audiences, at least, ‘there is intellectual work to do’.
We must describe, as graphically as we can, the reality of atrocities and 
human rights violations, what it means to be a victim of these crimes. And we 
must analyse the nature of our moral and democratic responsibilities to respond 
to them.
Th ese are not only feasible tasks, but they are morally required of those 
academics and public intellectuals who are trained to perform the role of what 
philosopher Herman Shue has called the ‘citizen expert’.
Th e task of the citizen expert – and, thus, the critical criminologist – is to try 
to develop a consensus on questions of how to respond to atrocities and gross 
violations of human rights and how to prevent such crimes against humanity 
from ever occurring again.67
63 J. Hagan and W. Rymond-Richmond, ‘Criminology Confronts Genocide: Whose side are 
you on?’ (2009) 13 Th eoretical Criminology 503-511, 509.
64 D. Garland in a blurb on the back of J. Savelberg, Crime and Human Rights: Criminology 
of Genocide and Atrocities, Sage, London 2010.
65 J.  Hagan and W.  Rymon-Richmond, Darfur and the Crime of Genocide, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2009, p. 222.
66 Ibid., p. 221.
67 N.C.  Crawford, ‘War “In Our Name” and Responsibility to Protest: Ordinary Citizens, 
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Th is work is essential because, ultimately, the key to mobilising public 
support is to ‘have  … good arguments, intelligently and energetically 
advanced.”68
Developing these arguments and publicly defending them is what critical 
criminologists can and should do in order to counter denialism and tackle the 
problem of indiff erence to human suff ering of distant others.
68 G.  Evans, ‘Crimes against humanity: overcoming indiff erence’ (2006) 8(3) Journal of 
Genocide Research 325-339.
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